某地理位置模拟APP从壳流程分析到破解
工具与环境
Xposed
IDA 6.8
JEB 2.2.5
Fiddler2
010Editor
NEXUS 5 Android 4.4
好久不玩逆向怕调试器生锈,拿出来磨磨！
高手莫要见笑，仅供小菜玩乐,有不对或不足的地方还请多多指教，不胜感激!
0x00： 程序大概情况分析
在我们拿到一个APP准备破解时一般得安装运行，程序运行后须要注册用户，随便注册一个用户登录，以下是APP须要购买vip才能使用的大概情况。
通过简单的查看可以知道是要通过网络支付后才能使用VIP，可以使用Fiddler进行抓包分析，但是请求体与返回值都是加密了的，目前还看不懂。
用JEB反编译app发现被加固了。
通过上面简单的分析后，该款应用为了防止被破解，主要做了以下几点防护。
利用第三方加固将app加固，网络验证是否为VIP权限。
0x01：壳反调试分析
通过第一部分的介绍，发现软件被加固了，接下来就是要脱掉壳才能更好地分析下去，挂上IDA在JNI_Onload下断点，反调试主要有，获取rtld_db_dlactivity判断是否为空，过反调试将获取到的内容清零就成了、time时间比较，将返回值清零，过/proc/self/status反调试将open函数返回0，过/proc/net/tcp也是将open函数返回0,文件监控不用管，还有一处比较隐藏的反调试raise，直接将函数改成返回，代码如下。
LOAD:75A6A038 F0 41 2D E9 STMFD SP!, {R4-R8,LR}
LOAD:75A6A03C F0 81 BD E8 LDMFD SP!, {R4-R8,PC};改成返回
LOAD:75A6A040 ; ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
LOAD:75A6A040 70 50 9F E5 LDR R5, =(off_75A72ED4 - 0x75A6A05C)
LOAD:75A6A044 70 20 9F E5 LDR R2, =(is_androidserver_prot - 0x75A6A058)
LOAD:75A6A048 70 60 9F E5 LDR R6, =0xE7F001F0
LOAD:75A6A04C 10 D0 4D E2 SUB SP, SP, #0x10
LOAD:75A6A050 02 20 8F E0 ADD R2, PC, R2 ; is_androidserver_prot
LOAD:75A6A054 05 50 9F E7 LDR R5, [PC,R5] ; off_75A72ED4
LOAD:75A6A058 03 30 9F E7 LDR R3, [PC,R3] ; off_75A72ED0
LOAD:75A6A05C 04 50 8D E5 STR R5, [SP,#0x10+var_C]
LOAD:75A6A060 08 30 8D E5 STR R3, [SP,#0x10+var_8]
LOAD:75A6A064 0C 20 8D E5 STR R2, [SP,#0x10+var_4]
LOAD:75A6A068 04 70 8D E2 ADD R7, SP, #4
LOAD:75A6A06C 0C 80 8D E2 ADD R8, SP, #0x10+var_4
LOAD:75A6A070
LOAD:75A6A070 loc_75A6A070 ; CODE XREF: Anti_raise+70j
LOAD:75A6A070 04 40 45 E2 SUB R4, R5, #4
LOAD:75A6A074 24 50 85 E2 ADD R5, R5, #0x24
LOAD:75A6A078 01 00 00 EA B loc_75A6A084
LOAD:75A6A07C ; ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
LOAD:75A6A07C
LOAD:75A6A07C loc_75A6A07C ; CODE XREF: Anti_raise+54j
LOAD:75A6A07C 05 00 54 E1 CMP R4, R5
LOAD:75A6A080 06 00 00 0A BEQ loc_75A6A0A0
LOAD:75A6A084
LOAD:75A6A084 loc_75A6A084 ; CODE XREF: Anti_raise+40j
LOAD:75A6A084 ; Anti_raise+64j
LOAD:75A6A084 04 30 B4 E5 LDR R3, [R4,#4]!
LOAD:75A6A088 06 00 53 E1 CMP R3, R6
LOAD:75A6A08C FA FF FF 1A BNE loc_75A6A07C
LOAD:75A6A090 09 00 A0 E3 MOV R0, #9 ; sig
LOAD:75A6A094 25 F6 FF EB BL raise
LOAD:75A6A098 05 00 54 E1 CMP R4, R5
LOAD:75A6A09C F8 FF FF 1A BNE loc_75A6A084
LOAD:75A6A0A0
LOAD:75A6A0A0 loc_75A6A0A0 ; CODE XREF: Anti_raise+48j
LOAD:75A6A0A0 08 00 57 E1 CMP R7, R8
LOAD:75A6A0A4 04 50 B7 15 LDRNE R5, [R7,#0xC+var_8]!
LOAD:75A6A0A8 F0 FF FF 1A BNE loc_75A6A070
LOAD:75A6A0AC 10 D0 8D E2 ADD SP, SP, #0x10
LOAD:75A6A0B0 F0 81 BD E8 LDMFD SP!, {R4-R8,PC}
LOAD:75A6A0B0 ; End of function Anti_raise
LOAD:75A6A0B0以上就是过掉所有主要的反调试了!
0x02：壳大致流程分析与Dump出解密后的dex
过掉反调试后在Case 29 与case33下好断点，代码如下：
//case 29 文件偏移：9DB8
/data/app-lib/com.txy.anywhere-1/libjiagu_old.so 75A66000 00050000
LOAD:75A6FDB8
LOAD:75A6FDB8 loc_75A6FDB8 ; CODE XREF: __fun_a_18(char *,uint):loc_75A6F8CCj
LOAD:75A6FDB8 ; __fun_a_18(char *,uint):loc_75A6F8DCj ...
LOAD:75A6FDB8 01 30 8C E2 ADD R3, R12, #1 ; jumptable 75A6F8DC case 29
LOAD:75A6FDBC 03 20 D4 E7 LDRB R2, [R4,R3]
LOAD:75A6FDC0 1C 30 8D E5 STR R3, [SP,#0xCC+var_B0]
LOAD:75A6FDC4 00 00 52 E3 CMP R2, #0
LOAD:75A6FDC8 C9 01 00 0A BEQ loc_75A704F4
LOAD:75A6FDCC 80 05 95 E9 LDMIB R5, {R7,R8,R10}
LOAD:75A6FDD0 0C 20 84 E0 ADD R2, R4, R12
LOAD:75A6FDD4 05 B0 92 E5 LDR R11, [R2,#5]
LOAD:75A6FDD8 38 20 95 E5 LDR R2, [R5,#0x38]
LOAD:75A6FDDC 03 30 94 E7 LDR R3, [R4,R3]
LOAD:75A6FDE0 09 C0 8C E2 ADD R12, R12, #9
LOAD:75A6FDE4 1C C0 8D E5 STR R12, [SP,#0xCC+var_B0]
LOAD:75A6FDE8 02 B0 8B E0 ADD R11, R11, R2
LOAD:75A6FDEC 0B B0 63 E0 RSB R11, R3, R11
LOAD:75A6FDF0 00 C0 95 E5 LDR R12, [R5]
LOAD:75A6FDF4 0C 00 A0 E1 MOV R0, R12
LOAD:75A6FDF8 07 10 A0 E1 MOV R1, R7
LOAD:75A6FDFC 08 20 A0 E1 MOV R2, R8
LOAD:75A6FE00 0A 30 A0 E1 MOV R3, R10
LOAD:75A6FE04 0B E0 A0 E1 MOV LR, R11
LOAD:75A6FE08 3E FF 2F E1 BLX LR
LOAD:75A6FE0C 00 70 A0 E1 MOV R7, R0
LOAD:75A6FE10 01 C0 A0 E1 MOV R12, R1
LOAD:75A6FE14 00 70 85 E5 STR R7, [R5] ; jumptable 000098CC case 28
LOAD:75A6FE18 04 C0 85 E5 STR R12, [R5,#4]
LOAD:75A6FE1C 1C C0 9D E5 LDR R12, [SP,#0xCC+var_B0]
LOAD:75A6FE20 A9 FE FF EA B loc_75A6F8CC
//case 33 执行解压函数与执行解密后第二个so的JNI_OnLoad函数 文件偏移: 9B44
/data/app-lib/com.txy.anywhere-1/libjiagu_old.so 75A66000 00050000
LOAD:75A6FB44 loc_75A6FB44 ; CODE XREF: __fun_a_18(char *,uint):loc_75A6F8CCj
LOAD:75A6FB44 ; __fun_a_18(char *,uint):loc_75A6F8DCj ...
LOAD:75A6FB44 01 30 8C E2 ADD R3, R12, #1 ; jumptable 75A6F8DC case 33
LOAD:75A6FB48 03 20 D4 E7 LDRB R2, [R4,R3]
LOAD:75A6FB4C 1C 30 8D E5 STR R3, [SP,#0xCC+var_B0]
LOAD:75A6FB50 00 00 52 E3 CMP R2, #arg_0
LOAD:75A6FB54 66 02 00 0A BEQ loc_75A704F4
LOAD:75A6FB58 02 30 8C E2 ADD R3, R12, #2
LOAD:75A6FB5C 03 20 94 E7 LDR R2, [R4,R3]
LOAD:75A6FB60 1C 30 8D E5 STR R3, [SP,#0xCC+var_B0]
LOAD:75A6FB64 06 C0 8C E2 ADD R12, R12, #6
LOAD:75A6FB68 02 B1 95 E7 LDR R11, [R5,R2,LSL#2]
LOAD:75A6FB6C 1C C0 8D E5 STR R12, [SP,#0xCC+var_B0]
LOAD:75A6FB70 80 15 95 E8 LDMIA R5, {R7,R8,R10,R12}
LOAD:75A6FB74 07 00 A0 E1 MOV R0, R7
LOAD:75A6FB78 08 10 A0 E1 MOV R1, R8
LOAD:75A6FB7C 0A 20 A0 E1 MOV R2, R10
LOAD:75A6FB80 0C 30 A0 E1 MOV R3, R12
LOAD:75A6FB84 0B E0 A0 E1 MOV LR, R11
LOAD:75A6FB88 3E FF 2F E1 BLX LR
LOAD:75A6FB8C 00 C0 A0 E1 MOV R12, R0 ; jumptable 000098CC case 32
LOAD:75A6FB90 00 C0 85 E5 STR R12, [R5]
LOAD:75A6FB94 1C C0 9D E5 LDR R12, [SP,#0x50+var_34下好断点后一直F9会发现主是逻辑就是获取解压函数(uncompressc)解压第二个so数据，解压后就是解密第二个SO了。接下来就是在内存中加载第二个SO并获取JNI_OnLoad函数。
LOAD:401030A8 F0 40 2D E9 STMFD SP!, {R4-R7,LR}
LOAD:401030AC C8 40 9F E5 LDR R4, =(off_40109EC0 - 0x401030C0)
LOAD:401030B0 9C D0 4D E2 SUB SP, SP, #0x9C
LOAD:401030B4 00 70 A0 E1 MOV R7, R0
LOAD:401030B8 04 40 9F E7 LDR R4, [PC,R4]
LOAD:401030BC 00 30 94 E5 LDR R3, [R4]
LOAD:401030C0
LOAD:401030C0 loc_401030C0 ; DATA XREF: LOAD:4010317Co
LOAD:401030C0 01 60 A0 E1 MOV R6, R1
LOAD:401030C4 94 20 A0 E3 MOV R2, #0x94 ; '
LOAD:401030C8 00 10 A0 E3 MOV R1, #0
LOAD:401030CC 0D 00 A0 E1 MOV R0, SP
LOAD:401030D0 94 30 8D E5 STR R3, [SP,#0x94]
LOAD:401030D4 B5 ED FF EB BL memset
LOAD:401030D8 A0 30 9F E5 LDR R3, =0x6F732E2A
LOAD:401030DC 00 20 A0 E3 MOV R2, #0
LOAD:401030E0 0D 00 A0 E1 MOV R0, SP
LOAD:401030E4 0C 30 8D E5 STR R3, [SP,#0xC]
LOAD:401030E8 10 20 CD E5 STRB R2, [SP,#0x10]
LOAD:401030EC 00 70 8D E5 STR R7, [SP]
LOAD:401030F0 04 60 8D E5 STR R6, [SP,#4]
LOAD:401030F4 EB F2 FF EB BL sub_400FFCA8
LOAD:401030F8 84 30 9F E5 LDR R3, =(dword_4014D740 - 0x40103108)
LOAD:401030FC 84 10 9F E5 LDR R1, =(aMakekey - 0x4010310C)
LOAD:40103100 03 30 8F E0 ADD R3, PC, R3
LOAD:40103104 01 10 8F E0 ADD R1, PC, R1
LOAD:40103108
LOAD:40103108 loc_40103108 ; DATA XREF: LOAD:40103184o
LOAD:40103108 00 00 83 E5 STR R0, [R3]
LOAD:4010310C
LOAD:4010310C loc_4010310C ; DATA XREF: LOAD:40103188o
LOAD:4010310C F2 F2 FF EB BL my_dlsym
LOAD:40103110 00 30 50 E2 SUBS R3, R0, #0
LOAD:40103114 08 00 00 0A BEQ loc_4010313C
LOAD:40103118 FF 0E C3 E3 BIC R0, R3, #0xFF0
LOAD:4010311C 0F 00 C0 E3 BIC R0, R0, #0xF
LOAD:40103120 01 1A A0 E3 MOV R1, #0x1000
LOAD:40103124 03 20 A0 E3 MOV R2, #3
LOAD:40103128 7D 70 A0 E3 MOV R7, #0x7D ; '}'
LOAD:4010312C 00 00 00 EF SVC 0
LOAD:40103130 54 20 9F E5 LDR R2, =(loc_40102C0C - 0x4010313C)
LOAD:40103134 02 20 8F E0 ADD R2, PC, R2
LOAD:40103138 00 20 83 E5 STR R2, [R3]
LOAD:4010313C
LOAD:4010313C loc_4010313C ; DATA XREF: LOAD:4010318Co
LOAD:4010313C 4C 30 9F E5 LDR R3, =(dword_4014D740 - 0x4010314C)
LOAD:40103140 4C 10 9F E5 LDR R1, =(aJni_onload - 0x40103150)
LOAD:40103144 03 30 8F E0 ADD R3, PC, R3
LOAD:40103148 01 10 8F E0 ADD R1, PC, R1
LOAD:4010314C
LOAD:4010314C loc_4010314C ; DATA XREF: LOAD:40103190o
LOAD:4010314C 00 00 93 E5 LDR R0, [R3]
LOAD:40103150
LOAD:40103150 loc_40103150 ; DATA XREF: LOAD:40103194o
LOAD:40103150 E1 F2 FF EB BL my_dlsym ; 获取第二个SO的JNI_OnLoad函数
LOAD:40103154 94 10 9D E5 LDR R1, [SP,#0x94]
LOAD:40103158 38 30 9F E5 LDR R3, =(dword_4014D744 - 0x40103168)
LOAD:4010315C 00 20 94 E5 LDR R2, [R4]
LOAD:40103160 03 30 8F E0 ADD R3, PC, R3
LOAD:40103164 02 00 51 E1 CMP R1, R2
LOAD:40103168
LOAD:40103168 loc_40103168 ; DATA XREF: LOAD:40103198o
LOAD:40103168 00 00 83 E5 STR R0, [R3]
LOAD:4010316C 01 00 00 1A BNE loc_40103178
LOAD:40103170 9C D0 8D E2 ADD SP, SP, #0x9C
LOAD:40103174 F0 80 BD E8 LDMFD SP!, {R4-R7,PC}
LOAD:40103178
LOAD:40103178 loc_40103178获取到第二个SO的JNI_OnLoad函数地址后走到Case 33处跳到第二个SO的JNI_OnLoad去执行了，到此第一个SO的主要工作就基本完成了。
第二个SO的JNI_OnLoad主要工作就是注册壳本身的 Native函数与被Native的onCreate函数。
//注册 Native onCreate 文件偏移 C252 debug190 76174000 761DA000 R . X D . byte 00 public CODE 32 00 01 debug190:76180252 loc_76180252 ; CODE XREF: debug190:7618028Aj debug190:76180252 ; debug190:76180292j ... debug190:76180252 D7 23 MOVS R3, #0xD7 ; ' debug190:76180254 09 98 LDR R0, [SP,#0x24] debug190:76180256 9B 00 LSLS R3, R3, #2 debug190:76180258 01 68 LDR R1, [R0] debug190:7618025A CB 58 LDR R3, [R1,R3] debug190:7618025C 21 1C MOVS R1, R4 debug190:7618025E 9C 46 MOV R12, R3 debug190:76180260 01 23 MOVS R3, #1 debug190:76180262 E0 47 BLX R12 ; Native onCreate R2:存放注册信息,签名等 debug190:76180264 5B 46 MOV R3, R11 debug190:76180266 01 22 MOVS R2, #1 debug190:76180268 1B 78 LDRB R3, [R3] debug190:7618026A 1A 42 TST R2, R3 debug190:7618026C 00 D0 BEQ loc_76180270 debug190:7618026E A7 E1 B loc_761805C0
下面是我通过hook注册函数打印出来的对应类的Native函数,在后面SO劫持会有说.
class-Ldalvik/system/DexFile; ->name=getClassNameList address=75FE10F9 class-Lcom/qihoo/bugreport/javacrash/CrashReportDataFactory; ->name=interface9 address=7600917D class-Lcom/qihoo/util/StubApp296881940; ->name=mark address=75FF75FD class-Lcom/qihoo/util/StubApp296881940; ->name=mark address=75FFBE45 class-Lcom/qihoo/util/StubApp296881940; ->name=mark address=75FFBD91 class-Lcom/qihoo/util/StubApp296881940; ->name=interface10 address=75FFE819 class-Lcom/qihoo/util/StubApp296881940; ->name=interface5 address=75FE0375 class-Lcom/qihoo/util/StubApp296881940; ->name=interface6 address=75FDD95D class-Lcom/qihoo/util/StubApp296881940; ->name=interface7 address=75FE1801 class-Lcom/qihoo/util/StubApp296881940; ->name=interface8 address=75FDDCFD class-Lcom/mob/tools/MobUIShell; ->name=onCreate address=75FDF729 class-Lcom/txy/anywhere/activity/GreenHandGuideActivity; ->name=onCreate address=75FDF6F1 class-Lcom/txy/anywhere/activity/MainActivity; ->name=onCreate address=75FDF6B9 class-Lcom/txy/anywhere/activity/PanoramaActivity; ->name=onCreate address=75FDF681 class-Lcom/txy/anywhere/activity/move/MoveDetailActivity; ->name=onCreate address=75FDF649 class-Lcom/txy/anywhere/activity/move/MoveSettingsMapChoiceActivity; ->name=onCreate address=75FDF611 class-Lcom/txy/anywhere/activity/specific/SpecificProgramDetailActivity; ->name=onCreate address=75FDF5D9 class-Lcom/txy/anywhere/wxapi/WXPayEntryActivity; ->name=onCreate address=75FDF5A1 class-Lcom/common/customp/PullEntry; ->name=getAppkey address=75FE1439
接下来就是解密原始DEX了，解密逻辑如下:
//解密dex
密钥 A0 EC E6 CC FB A6 F1 A2 EC A3 E7 AF E1 5A EA 2F
debug190:761BB0E0 ; ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
debug190:761BB0E0 F0 B5 PUSH {R4-R7,LR}
debug190:761BB0E2 57 46 MOV R7, R10
debug190:761BB0E4 4E 46 MOV R6, R9
debug190:761BB0E6 45 46 MOV R5, R8
debug190:761BB0E8 E0 B4 PUSH {R5-R7}
debug190:761BB0EA 16 1C MOVS R6, R2
debug190:761BB0EC 80 22 MOVS R2, #0x80 ; ' ?#39;
debug190:761BB0EE 80 46 MOV R8, R0
debug190:761BB0F0 24 4C LDR R4, =(dword_761DCD20 - 0x761BB0FA)
debug190:761BB0F2 C2 B0 SUB SP, SP, #0x108
debug190:761BB0F4 1F 1C MOVS R7, R3
debug190:761BB0F6 7C 44 ADD R4, PC ; dword_761DCD20
debug190:761BB0F8 4A 9B LDR R3, [SP,#0x128]
debug190:761BB0FA 24 68 LDR R4, [R4]
debug190:761BB0FC 01 AD ADD R5, SP, #4
debug190:761BB0FE 99 46 MOV R9, R3
debug190:761BB100 23 68 LDR R3, [R4]
debug190:761BB102 8A 46 MOV R10, R1
debug190:761BB104 28 1C MOVS R0, R5
debug190:761BB106 00 21 MOVS R1, #0
debug190:761BB108 52 00 LSLS R2, R2, #1
debug190:761BB10A 41 93 STR R3, [SP,#0x104]
debug190:761BB10C 10 F0 4E FA BL j_j_memset_1
debug190:761BB110 43 46 MOV R3, R8
debug190:761BB112 59 68 LDR R1, [R3,#4]
debug190:761BB114 00 29 CMP R1, #0
debug190:761BB116 2D D0 BEQ loc_761BB174
debug190:761BB118 28 1C MOVS R0, R5
debug190:761BB11A 10 22 MOVS R2, #0x10
debug190:761BB11C 00 F0 94 F8 BL Rc4_Key_Init ; A0 EC E6 CC FB A6 F1 A2 EC A3 E7 AF E1 5A EA 2F
debug190:761BB120 3B 68 LDR R3, [R7]
debug190:761BB122 00 2B CMP R3, #0
debug190:761BB124 11 D0 BEQ loc_761BB14A
debug190:761BB126 28 1C MOVS R0, R5
debug190:761BB128 51 46 MOV R1, R10
debug190:761BB12A 32 1C MOVS R2, R6
debug190:761BB12C 00 F0 D6 F8 BL Rc4_Dec
debug190:761BB130 4B 46 MOV R3, R9
debug190:761BB132 00 20 MOVS R0, #0
debug190:761BB134 1E 60 STR R6, [R3]
debug190:761BB136
debug190:761BB136 loc_761BB136 ; CODE XREF: debug190:761BB172j
debug190:761BB136 ; debug190:761BB178j ...
debug190:761BB136 41 9A LDR R2, [SP,#0x104]
debug190:761BB138 23 68 LDR R3, [R4]
debug190:761BB13A 9A 42 CMP R2, R3
debug190:761BB13C 20 D1 BNE loc_761BB180
debug190:761BB13E 42 B0 ADD SP, SP, #0x108
debug190:761BB140 1C BC POP {R2-R4}
debug190:761BB142 90 46 MOV R8, R2
debug190:761BB144 99 46 MOV R9, R3
debug190:761BB146 A2 46 MOV R10, R4
debug190:761BB148 F0 BD POP {R4-R7,PC}
debug190:761BB14A ; ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
debug190:761BB14A
debug190:761BB14A loc_761BB14A ; CODE XREF: debug190:761BB124j
debug190:761BB14A 30 1C MOVS R0, R6
debug190:761BB14C 10 F0 96 FA BL malloc_0
debug190:761BB150 80 46 MOV R8, R0
debug190:761BB152 00 28 CMP R0, #0
debug190:761BB154 11 D0 BEQ loc_761BB17A
debug190:761BB156 51 46 MOV R1, R10
debug190:761BB158 32 1C MOVS R2, R6
debug190:761BB15A 10 F0 17 FA BL memcpy_0 ; 拷贝加密的dex内容
debug190:761BB15E 28 1C MOVS R0, R5
debug190:761BB160 41 46 MOV R1, R8
debug190:761BB162 32 1C MOVS R2, R6
debug190:761BB164 00 F0 BA F8 BL Rc4_Dec ; 解密Dex内容
debug190:761BB168 4B 46 MOV R3, R9
debug190:761BB16A 1E 60 STR R6, [R3]
debug190:761BB16C 43 46 MOV R3, R8
debug190:761BB16E 00 20 MOVS R0, #0
debug190:761BB170 3B 60 STR R3, [R7]
debug190:761BB172 E0 E7 B loc_761BB136
debug190:761BB174 ; ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
debug190:761BB174
//再次解密dex 文件偏移 EDF4
debug190 76174000 761DA000 R . X D . byte 00 public CODE 32 00 01
debug190:76182DF4 loc_76182DF4 ; CODE XREF: debug190:76182DB6j
debug190:76182DF4 51 46 MOV R1, R10
debug190:76182DF6 34 F0 F3 FA BL loc_761B73E0
debug190:76182DFA 00 28 CMP R0, #0
debug190:76182DFC DC DB BLT loc_76182DB8
debug190:76182DFE 53 46 MOV R3, R10
debug190:76182E00 1B 68 LDR R3, [R3]
debug190:76182E02 58 46 MOV R0, R11
debug190:76182E04 9A 46 MOV R10, R3
debug190:76182E06 5B 46 MOV R3, R11
debug190:76182E08 1B 68 LDR R3, [R3]
debug190:76182E0A 05 99 LDR R1, [SP,#0x14]
debug190:76182E0C 06 9A LDR R2, [SP,#0x18]
debug190:76182E0E DB 68 LDR R3, [R3,#0xC]
debug190:76182E10 9C 46 MOV R12, R3
debug190:76182E12 53 46 MOV R3, R10
debug190:76182E14 E0 47 BLX R12 ; 又是解密
debug190:76182E16 00 28 CMP R0, #0
debug190:76182E18 CE DB BLT loc_76182DB8
debug190:76182E1A 05 98 LDR R0, [SP,#0x14]
debug190:76182E1C 48 F0 0E FC BL free_0
debug190:76182E20 5B 46 MOV R3, R11
debug190:76182E22 1B 68 LDR R3, [R3]
debug190:76182E24 58 46 MOV R0, R11
debug190:76182E26 5B 68 LDR R3, [R3,#4]
debug190:76182E28 98 47 BLX R3
debug190:76182E2A 03 9B LDR R3, [SP,#0xC]
debug190:76182E2C 4D 44 ADD R5, R9
debug190:76182E2E 53 44 ADD R3, R10
debug190:76182E30 18 1C MOVS R0, R3
debug190:76182E32 9D 42 CMP R5, R3
debug190:76182E34 05 D0 BEQ loc_76182E42 ; 解密dex
debug190:76182E36 00 2E CMP R6, #0
debug190:76182E38 03 D0 BEQ loc_76182E42 ; 解密dex
debug190:76182E3A 29 1C MOVS R1, R5
debug190:76182E3C 32 1C MOVS R2, R6
debug190:76182E3E FE F7 49 FF BL loc_76181CD4
//解密dex 头0x70字节 文件偏移 EE42
debug190 76174000 761DA000 R . X D . byte 00 public CODE 32 00 01
debug190:76182E42 loc_76182E42 ; CODE XREF: sub_76182C48+1ECj
debug190:76182E42 ; sub_76182C48+1F0j
debug190:76182E42 7A 69 LDR R2, [R7,#0x14] ; 解密dex
debug190:76182E44 50 46 MOV R0, R10
debug190:76182E46 70 21 MOVS R1, #0x70 ; 'p'
debug190:76182E48 38 F0 90 F8 BL sub_761BAF6C ; 解密dex头70字节
debug190:76182E4C 01 25 MOVS R5, #1
debug190:76182E4E B9 E7 B loc_76182DC4这时就可以将DEX数据dump出来，其实后面每个onCreate中也会出现明文的DEX。
将dump出来的dex通过JDE反编译后发现很多Activity中的onCreate函数变成了Native了，从上面打印的类与对应函数可以看得出。
0x03：被Native后的onCreate分析, 尝试修复与猜想
在上面分析到注册Native函数时就对onCreate函数下好了断点，直接F9来到onCreate断下。
//出现解密后dex 文件偏移 A910 debug098 75DC6000 75E2C000 R . X D . byte 00 public CODE 32 00 01 debug098:75DD0910 loc_75DD0910 ; CODE XREF: debug098:75DD08F2j debug098:75DD0910 05 9B LDR R3, [SP,#0x14] debug098:75DD0912 1C 20 MOVS R0, #0x1C debug098:75DD0914 1F 68 LDR R7, [R3] ; 出现解密后dex debug098:75DD0916 B3 68 LDR R3, [R6,#8] debug098:75DD0918 9C 46 MOV R12, R3 debug098:75DD091A 67 44 ADD R7, R12
F8一直单步走到定位指令的地方。
//定位到dex中的onCreate方法在内存中的指令，获取dex中的onCreate指令并解密。 文件偏移 2F9F8 debug098 75DC6000 75E2C000 R . X D . byte 00 public CODE 32 00 01 debug098:75DF59F8 debug098:75DF59F8 loc_75DF59F8 ; CODE XREF: debug098:75DF5988j debug098:75DF59F8 ; debug098:75DF59CAj debug098:75DF59F8 A3 68 LDR R3, [R4,#8] debug098:75DF59FA 10 33 ADDS R3, #0x10 ; 定位到onCreate指令 debug098:75DF59FC 1E 1C MOVS R6, R3 debug098:75DF59FE 0C 93 STR R3, [SP,#0x30] debug098:75DF5A00 debug098:75DF5A00 loc_75DF5A00 ; CODE XREF: debug098:75DF5E54j debug098:75DF5A00 ; debug098:75DF5EF4j ... debug098:75DF5A00 0C 9B LDR R3, [SP,#0x30] debug098:75DF5A02 00 21 MOVS R1, #0 debug098:75DF5A04 F0 1A SUBS R0, R6, R3 debug098:75DF5A06 43 10 ASRS R3, R0, #1 debug098:75DF5A08 30 1C MOVS R0, R6 debug098:75DF5A0A 06 93 STR R3, [SP,#0x18] debug098:75DF5A0C FE F7 29 FE BL GetCode ; 获取dex中的onCreate指令并解密 debug098:75DF5A10 05 90 STR R0, [SP,#0x14] debug098:75DF5A12 00 06 LSLS R0, R0, #0x18 debug098:75DF5A14 00 0E LSRS R0, R0, #0x18 debug098:75DF5A16 01 38 SUBS R0, #1 ; switch 255 cases debug098:75DF5A18 FE 28 CMP R0, #0xFE ; ' ;判断是否超出表示指令范围 debug098:75DF5A1A 01 D9 BLS loc_75DF5A20 debug098:75DF5A1C 02 F0 8D FF BL def_75DF5A20 ; jumptable 75DF5A20 default case
比如 下面是dex中OnCreate的指令，
读取上面的指令并解密。
//获取指令，并解密 文件偏移 2E662
debug098 75DC6000 75E2C000 R . X D . byte 00 public CODE 32 00 01
debug098:75DF4662 GetCode ; CODE XREF: debug098:75DF5A0Cp
debug098:75DF4662 ; debug098:75DF5E40p ...
debug098:75DF4662 38 B5 PUSH {R3-R5,LR}
debug098:75DF4664 05 1C MOVS R5, R0
debug098:75DF4666 0C 1C MOVS R4, R1
debug098:75DF4668 FD F7 D6 FC BL loc_75DF2018
debug098:75DF466C 00 7E LDRB R0, [R0,#0x18] ; 密钥
debug098:75DF466E 64 00 LSLS R4, R4, #1
debug098:75DF4670 02 1C MOVS R2, R0
debug098:75DF4672 03 02 LSLS R3, R0, #8
debug098:75DF4674 1A 43 ORRS R2, R3
debug098:75DF4676 63 5B LDRH R3, [R4,R5] ; 取指令
debug098:75DF4678 5A 40 EORS R2, R3 ；解密
debug098:75DF467A 10 1C MOVS R0, R2
debug098:75DF467C 38 BD POP {R3-R5,PC}解密后判断指令类型，获取执行须要的数据，每一种操作码（OPCode）都对应有一个处理逻辑（是一段代码，但不一定是函数），然后跳转到对应的处理逻辑去处理它，简单说一个正常没加壳的指令格式。
71 20 06 00 02 00 invoke-static {v2, v0}, int aurora.view.AuroraTest.Test2(int, java.lang.String)
71操作码
2 参数个数
0006 method idx
02参数V2
00参数 V0
对应Android官方指令表
但是加壳后的指令被变成了自己定义的了，我第一次想法是想通过分析加壳前与加壳后指令对应关系，只要找到足够多的指令就能将其还原，我简单加了两个apk测试，从第一个中找到了如下的指令对应关系。
真实指令 自定义指令 6f = 74 6E = 22 0c = cc 1f = 9c 60 = 5a 39 = 9c 1a = 89 22 = 4B 71 = 0b 70 = 33 15 = 5b 5b = e4 54 = 5c 6f = 74 14 = 08 0e = 8e
将第一个apk中找到的指令来修复第二个指令，不知道是免费版的原因，还是巧合，我成功修复了第二个apk，但是当我用这个关系来尝试修复要破解的程序时根本不行，后来想了想，这种方法应当不行，都自己实现了解释器，为什么还要让指令固定呢？不科学呀，放弃了这种想法。
其实壳读取并解密一条指令后主要是使用JNI接口函数来实现解析执行。
如果指令类型是调用函数的话就会做如下动作，其它的调用其它接口(简单示例)
jclass clazz=(*env)->FindClass(env,"com/example/test"); jmethodID methodId=(*env)->GetMethodID(env,clazz,"Add","(II)I"); // jint (*CallIntMethod)(JNIEnv*, jobject, jmethodID, ...); (*env)->CallIntMethod(env,jobject,methodId,3,5);
主要流程如下：
//获取dex中的类名、函数名、签名 文件偏移 2E648
debug098 75DC6000 75E2C000 R . X D . byte 00 public CODE 32 00 01
debug098:75DF4648
debug098:75DF4648 GetString ; CODE XREF: debug098:75DF4C52p
debug098:75DF4648 ; debug098:75DF4C78p ...
debug098:75DF4648 03 69 LDR R3, [R0,#0x10]
debug098:75DF464A 02 68 LDR R2, [R0]
debug098:75DF464C 89 00 LSLS R1, R1, #2
debug098:75DF464E DB 6B LDR R3, [R3,#0x3C]
debug098:75DF4650 C9 18 ADDS R1, R1, R3
debug098:75DF4652 8B 58 LDR R3, [R1,R2]
debug098:75DF4654 D0 18 ADDS R0, R2, R3
debug098:75DF4656
debug098:75DF4656 loc_75DF4656 ; CODE XREF: debug098:75DF465Ej
debug098:75DF4656 01 30 ADDS R0, #1
debug098:75DF4658 43 1E SUBS R3, R0, #1
debug098:75DF465A 1B 78 LDRB R3, [R3]
debug098:75DF465C 7F 2B CMP R3, #0x7F ; ''
debug098:75DF465E FA D8 BHI loc_75DF4656
debug098:75DF4660 70 47 BX LR
FindClass 文件偏移 18956
debug098 75DC6000 75E2C000 R . X D . byte 00 public CODE 32 00 01
debug098:75DDE956 sub_75DDE956 ; CODE XREF: debug098:75DF4CBAp
debug098:75DDE956 ; debug098:75DF5092p ...
debug098:75DDE956 08 B5 PUSH {R3,LR}
debug098:75DDE958 03 68 LDR R3, [R0]
debug098:75DDE95A 9B 69 LDR R3, [R3,#0x18]
debug098:75DDE95C 98 47 BLX R3 ; FindClass
debug098:75DDE95E 08 BD POP {R3,PC}
ExceptionCheck 文件偏移 1802E
debug096 75DC6000 75E2C000 R . X D . byte 00 public CODE 32 00 01
debug096:75DDE02E loc_75DDE02E ; CODE XREF: debug096:75DDE046p
debug096:75DDE02E ; debug096:75DF4BECp ...
debug096:75DDE02E 08 B5 PUSH {R3,LR}
debug096:75DDE030 E4 23 MOVS R3, #0xE4 ; '
debug096:75DDE032 02 68 LDR R2, [R0]
debug096:75DDE034 9B 00 LSLS R3, R3, #2
debug096:75DDE036 D3 58 LDR R3, [R2,R3]
debug096:75DDE038 98 47 BLX R3 ; ExceptionCheck
debug096:75DDE03A 08 BD POP {R3,PC}
//GetMethodID 文件偏移
debug098 75DC6000 75E2C000 R . X D . byte 00 public CODE 32 00 01
debug098:75DFB11E loc_75DFB11E ; CODE XREF: debug098:75DFB10Ej
debug098:75DFB11E 00 98 LDR R0, [SP]
debug098:75DFB120 04 99 LDR R1, [SP,#0x10]
debug098:75DFB122 01 9A LDR R2, [SP,#4]
debug098:75DFB124 B0 47 BLX R6 ; GetMethodID
debug098:75DFB126 06 1C MOVS R6, R0
debug098:75DFB128 28 1C MOVS R0, R5
//DeleteLocalRef 文件偏移 18018
debug096 75DC6000 75E2C000 R . X D . byte 00 public CODE 32 00 01
debug096:75DDE018 loc_75DDE018 ; CODE XREF: debug096:75DDE062p
debug096:75DDE018 ; debug096:75DF528Ap ...
debug096:75DDE018 08 B5 PUSH {R3,LR}
debug096:75DDE01A 03 68 LDR R3, [R0]
debug096:75DDE01C DB 6D LDR R3, [R3,#0x5C]
debug096:75DDE01E 98 47 BLX R3 ; DeleteLocalRef
debug096:75DDE020 08 BD POP {R3,PC}
//CallNonvirtualVoidMethodA 文件偏移 2EFEC
debug096 75DC6000 75E2C000 R . X D . byte 00 public CODE 32 00 01
debug096:75DF4FEC loc_75DF4FEC ; CODE XREF: sub_75DF4B50:loc_75DF4F0Cj
debug096:75DF4FEC 23 68 LDR R3, [R4] ; jumptable 75DF4F0C case 86
debug096:75DF4FEE 02 9A LDR R2, [SP,#0x108+var_100]
debug096:75DF4FF0 20 1C MOVS R0, R4
debug096:75DF4FF2 FC 33 ADDS R3, #0xFC ; '
debug096:75DF4FF4 00 92 STR R2, [SP,#0x108+var_108]
debug096:75DF4FF6 9D 6F LDR R5, [R3,#0x78]
debug096:75DF4FF8 04 99 LDR R1, [SP,#0x108+var_F8]
debug096:75DF4FFA 18 9A LDR R2, [SP,#0x108+var_A8]
debug096:75DF4FFC 03 9B LDR R3, [SP,#0x108+var_FC]
debug096:75DF4FFE A8 47 BLX R5 ; CallNonvirtualVoidMethodA
debug096:75DF5000 4D E1 B def_75DF4F0C ; jumptable 75DF4F0C default case通过上面的流程分析后，我猜想能不能hook或者用其它方法来监控JNI接口，得到对应的执行流程与调用了那那些JNI函数，在对应着Android Dalvik bytecode指令表来反推出真实的指令，其实就是看一条指令执行完成后调用的JNI接口能不能确定是什么指令，目前还没有试，如果大牛们有什么好办法还请多多指教，目的是破解程序，静态分析己经可以了,先不考虑还原。(^_^)
来回顾下壳的主要流程：
壳主soà反调试à解压并解密第二个soà从主so中跳到第二个so中执行à第二人so注册native函数à解密原始DEXà程序跑起来后到Native onCreateà定位到自定义的指令à读取指令并解密à解析指令格式à获取执行指令须要的参数à调用JNI接口执行。
0x04：通过SO劫持跳过烦人的反调试快速到达要分析的函数
我想要是你玩过windows上破解都知道DLL劫持吧，先伪造一个同名的DLL，提供同样的输出函数，每个输出函数中转向真正的DLL函数，不错，我也是用这种方法来实现注入SO来Hook函数，过掉反调试，会省去很多时间反调试上面，直接到你想要分析的关键函数。
分析壳java层代码就知道它主要是通过读取从资源目中把壳so拷到指定目录中加载。
我的做法是hook getAssets().open()函数，将资源中的so替换成我的so，然后将壳so改名放在app-lib目录中给我的so加载。
XposedHelpers.findAndHookMethod(
AssetManager.class, //被Hook函数所在的类
"open", //被Hook函数的名称
String.class,
new XC_MethodHook(){
@Override
protected void beforeHookedMethod(MethodHookParam param)
throws Throwable {
// Hook函数之前执行的代码
String path = param.args[0].toString();
if(path.equals("libjiagu.so")){
param.args[0] = "/data/local/tmp/libjiagu.so";
}
Yfw_DebugLog.d("open beforeHookedMethod--->0 "+param.args[0].toString());
}
@Override
protected void afterHookedMethod(MethodHookParam param) throws Throwable {
File file = new File(param.args[0].toString());
InputStream input = new FileInputStream(file);
param.setResult(input);
Yfw_DebugLog.d("open afterHookedMethod--->"+param.getResult().toString());
}
});
So的代码也很简单：
/*
调用原始JNI_OnLoad
*/
jint LoadSo_InitJni(char* SoFilePath, JavaVM* vm, void* reserved)
{
jint ret;
void *pHandle = NULL;
pHandle = dlopen(SoFilePath, RTLD_LAZY);
if (NULL == pHandle)
{
LOGD("dlopen %s error!", SoFilePath);
return NULL;
}
_JNI_OnLoad old_JNI_OnLoad = NULL;
old_JNI_OnLoad = (_JNI_OnLoad)dlsym(pHandle, "JNI_OnLoad");
if (NULL == old_JNI_OnLoad)
{
LOGD("old_JNI_OnLoad error!");
return NULL;
}
LOGD("old_JNI_OnLoad address=%X env...%X", old_JNI_OnLoad, g_env);
ret = old_JNI_OnLoad(vm, reserved);
LOGD("old_JNI_OnLoad end...%d", ret);
return ret;
}
Hook open函数过反调试
int new_open(const char *pathname, int oflag, mode_t mode)
{
if (NULL == pathname)
{
goto exitret;
}
LOGD("new_open..%s", pathname);
if (strstr(pathname, "net/tcp") != NULL)
{
return 0;
}
if (strstr(pathname, "status") != NULL)
{
return 0;
}
if (strstr(pathname, "stat") != NULL)
{
return 0;
}
if (strstr(pathname, "schedstat") != NULL)
{
return 0;
}
exitret:
return old_open(pathname, oflag, mode);
}
Hook time过反调试
time_t new_time(time_t * timer) {
LOGD("new_time------->");
return 0;
}
Hook dvmUseJNIBridge 方便在 native下断点,打印出对应类的方法
void new_dvmUseJNIBridge(Method* method, void* func)
{
LOGD("my_dvmUseJNIBridge class-%s ->name=%s address=%08X", method->clazz->descriptor, method->name, func);
//LOGD("my_dvmUseJNIBridge nativeFunc-%s", method->nativeFunc);
if (0 == strcmp(method->name, "getClassNameList"))
{
sleep(8); //等待附加调试器
}
return old_dvmUseJNIBridge(method, func);
}这样当我们的so加载时用IDA附加上就可以在new_dvmUseJNIBridge下断点，就能在想要分析的Native函数上下断点了。
上面的代码就完成了整个劫持的过程，开心地调试吧!!!!!!
0x05：静态分析APP的注册验证流程与编写Xposed插件。
通过JEB反编译该应用dump出来的的classes.dex文件，直接搜索登录时用到的网址字符串 7658/api/entrance，找到如下的字符串，双击第一个字符串进去 。
其中的a函数是返回网址的，当参数为10时是要找到网址。
public static String a(int arg1) {
switch(arg1) {
case 10: {
goto label_4; //返回登录地址
}
case 11: {
goto label_6;
}
case 12: {
goto label_8;
}
case 13: {
goto label_10;
}
case 14: {
goto label_12;
}
case 15: {
goto label_14;
}
case 16: {
goto label_16;
}
case 17: {
goto label_18;
}
case 19: {
goto label_20;
}
case 20: {
goto label_22;
}
}按JEB快捷键 x 找到传入参数为10调用上面函数的地方，找到如下的类:
public class g extends j {
private static String login;
private ThreadPoolExecutor d;
private static g e;
static {
g.login = i.a(10);
g.e = null;
}
在这个类中找到了网络登录请求并解密返回值的函数。
private String b(h arg5, String arg6) {
String v0 = null;
if(arg5 != null && (arg6 != null && (AndroidHelper.isNetworkActive(this.b)))) {
String v1 = this.a(arg6, arg5.a()); // 组合请求参数
if(v1 == null) {
return v0;
}
try {
JSONObject v2 = new JSONObject(a.a(g.login_address, v1.getBytes("UTF-8"), this.c)); // 传入网址，应该就是网络请求了
if(v2.getInt("status") != 0) {
return v0;
}
v0 = j.b(v2.getString("data")); // 解密登录返回值
}
catch(Exception v0_1) {
d.a(((Throwable)v0_1));
v0 = "server_error";
}
}
return v0;
}分析下请求参数都有些什么东西，组合请求参数的函数实现在父类j中。
String a(String arg9, int arg10) {
String v0 = null;
if(arg9 != null) {
String v1 = j.a(this.c(arg9)); // aes加密后再base64
if(TextUtils.isEmpty(((CharSequence)v1))) {
return v0;
}
try {
StringBuffer v2 = new StringBuffer();
v2.append("body=");
v2.append(URLEncoder.encode(v1, "UTF-8"));
v2.append("&t1=");
v2.append(System.currentTimeMillis() / 1000);
v2.append("&t2=");
v2.append(this.d(arg9));
v2.append("&type=");
v2.append(arg10);
v2.append("&flag=");
v2.append(4);
v0 = v2.toString();
}
catch(UnsupportedEncodingException v1_1) {
d.a(((Throwable)v1_1));
}
}
return v0;
}用Xposed hook 加函数打印参数，
//aes加密参数
XposedHelpers.findAndHookMethod(Application.class, "attach", Context.class, new XC_MethodHook() {
@Override
protected void afterHookedMethod(MethodHookParam param) throws Throwable {
ClassLoader cl = ((Context)param.args[0]).getClassLoader();
Class<?> hookclass = null;
try {
hookclass = cl.loadClass("com.txyapp.client.j");
} catch (Exception e) {
Yfw_DebugLog.d("寻找com.txyapp.client.j 报错"+ e);
return;
}
Yfw_DebugLog.d("寻找com.txyapp.client.j成功");
XposedHelpers.findAndHookMethod(
hookclass, //被Hook函数所在的类
"a", //被Hook函数的名称
String.class,
new XC_MethodHook(){
@Override
protected void beforeHookedMethod(MethodHookParam param)
throws Throwable {
// Hook函数之前执行的代码
Yfw_DebugLog.d("a_Aesenc_data beforeHookedMethod--->0 "+param.args[0].toString());
}
@Override
protected void afterHookedMethod(MethodHookParam param) throws Throwable {
Yfw_DebugLog.d("a_Aesenc_data afterHookedMethod--->"+param.getResult().toString());
}
});
}
});主要是将用户名密码，还有一些机器信息aes与base加密后请求过去,格式如下：
{"data":"{\"clientid\":\"7e7884f241c96051958cb776d6f780d9\",\"password\":\"xxxxxxxxxx\",\"username\":\"crack8888\"}","header":{"model":"Nexus 5","root":1,"mcc":"460","uptime":1492303101,"sysapi":19,"corever":546,"vername":"13.1.2","un":"","cn":"guanfang","cl":"zh-CN","brand":"google","mnc":"02","uuid":"7FDC501E4B3xxxxx","cpuabi1":"armeabi-v7a","cpuabi2":"armeabi","vercode":322}}然后服务器返回一些加密后的数据,从上面的g类b函数中可以看出，判断如果请求成功，就解密返回数据，通过hook该解密函数得到解密后的数据格式为json。
XposedHelpers.findAndHookMethod(Application.class, "attach", Context.class, new XC_MethodHook() {
@Override
protected void afterHookedMethod(MethodHookParam param) throws Throwable {
ClassLoader cl = ((Context)param.args[0]).getClassLoader();
Class<?> hookclass = null;
try {
hookclass = cl.loadClass("com.txyapp.client.j");
} catch (Exception e) {
Yfw_DebugLog.d("寻找com.txyapp.client.j 报错"+ e);
return;
}
Yfw_DebugLog.d("寻找com.txyapp.client.j成功");
//解密vip
XposedHelpers.findAndHookMethod(
hookclass, //被Hook函数所在的类
"b", //被Hook函数的名称
String.class,
new XC_MethodHook(){
@Override
protected void beforeHookedMethod(MethodHookParam param)
throws Throwable {
// Hook函数之前执行的代码
Yfw_DebugLog.d("b_Aesdec_data beforeHookedMethod--->0 "+param.args[0].toString());
}
@Override
protected void afterHookedMethod(MethodHookParam param) throws Throwable {
Yfw_DebugLog.d("b_Aesdec_data afterHookedMethod--->"+param.getResult().toString());
JSONObject jsonObj = new JSONObject(param.getResult().toString());
if(0 == (int)jsonObj.get("vip") ){
jsonObj.put("vip", 1);
jsonObj.put("expiretime", 1999077441);// 2033-05-07
Yfw_DebugLog.d("b_Aesdec_data result--->"+jsonObj.toString());
viptag = 1;
param.setResult(jsonObj.toString());
}
}
});
}
});
//解密后数据
{"status":0,"token":"49436a44d85f46c7e458a6b071af470a","username":"crack8888","vip":0,"expiretime":0}从上面格式可以看出 vip:=0代表不是vip, expiretime:到期时间，所以我的在hook函数中将这两个参数修改如下。
{"vip":1,"username":"crack8888","token":"db9ea6e12936463d722fb7bcda7e97ab","status":0,"expiretime":1999077441}这样就成功破解了，会员功能也正常使用。
还有一个地方就是显示个人信息，hook函数进行修改
//刷新个人信息显示
XposedHelpers.findAndHookMethod(Application.class, "attach", Context.class, new XC_MethodHook() {
@Override
protected void afterHookedMethod(MethodHookParam param) throws Throwable {
ClassLoader cl = ((Context)param.args[0]).getClassLoader();
Class<?> hookclass = null;
try {
hookclass = cl.loadClass("com.txy.anywhere.activity.login.PersonalInfoActivity");
} catch (Exception e) {
Yfw_DebugLog.d("寻找com.txy.anywhere.activity.login.PersonalInfoActivity报错"+ e);
return;
}
Yfw_DebugLog.d("寻找com.txy.anywhere.activity.login.PersonalInfoActivity成功");
//判断是否为vip
XposedHelpers.findAndHookMethod(
hookclass, //被Hook函数所在的类
"a", //被Hook函数的名称
String.class,
new XC_MethodHook(){
@Override
protected void beforeHookedMethod(MethodHookParam param)
throws Throwable {
// Hook函数之前执行的代码
Yfw_DebugLog.d("login beforeHookedMethod--->0 "+param.args[0].toString());
JSONObject container1 = new JSONObject();
JSONObject v0_1 = new JSONObject(param.args[0].toString());
JSONObject v0_2 = new JSONObject(param.args[0].toString());
v0_2 = v0_1.getJSONObject("user_info");
v0_2.put("vip", 1);//是否为vip 0:为普通会员, 1:为vip
v0_2.put("expire_time", 1999077441);//到期时间
v0_2.put("phonenumber", "110");
v0_1.put("user_info", v0_2);
param.args[0] = v0_1.toString();
Yfw_DebugLog.d("login beforeHookedMethod 1--->0 "+param.args[0].toString());
}
@Override
protected void afterHookedMethod(MethodHookParam param) throws Throwable {
Yfw_DebugLog.d("login afterHookedMethod--->");
}
});
}
});到这里就算破解完成了，简单测试了会员功能，都能正常使用。
0x06：总结
由于水平有限，未能更好的分析与表达，不过，通过前面几部分的简单分析，其实我们已经知道只是Native onCreate函数是不够的，主要还是得保护好关键函数不被分析。
